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EVALUATING WATER POLIcY OPTIONS BY SIMULATION

Ann W. Peralta, Richard C. Peralta, A.M., and Keyvan Asghari*
ABSTRACT

Computer simulation models are used to predict the effects
of three sample water policy decisions on selected conjunctive
water use/sustained groundwater yield strategies for the Arkansas
Grand Prairie. The three applications illustrate the facility of
the target objective approach in providing an interface for
legal, economic and engineering analysis.
The approach is used
to evaluate potential water management decisions at the judicial,
legislative and water management district levels.
INTRODUCTION
.~'.'"

Water
resources
management requires consideration
of
physical, legal and economic realities.
Too often, attempts by
legislators, judges and administrtors to manage the physical
environment result in laws that are physically impossible (or
nearly impossible) to implement. A Colorado Act illustrates this
problem.
The Water Right Determination and Administration Act of 1969
defined the water policy of Colorado as the integration of "the
appropriation,
use and administration of underground water
tributary to a stream with the use of surface water in such a way
as to max~m~ze the b~neficial use of all the waters of this
state. 1I As Hubert Morel-Seytoux, et al (7) point out
1I • • • the lawmaker may not have fully realized the meaning
of the 'zeroth law' of Operations Research.
It is not
possible to maximize the beneficial use of surface water
and to maximize the beneficial use of groundwater at
the same time. It is possible, however, to maximize the
beneficial use of surface water while maintaining a
given level of beneficial use of groundwater, or vice
versa.
Or, more significantly, it is possible to maximize an overall beneficial us~ of groundwater and
surface water. What this overall objective function
should be is not precisely spelled out by the Act."
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Average annual withdrawals from the aquifer have long exceeded
recharge and a number of wells have become unusable (13).
In
recent years,' concern over (i) the 1980 drought and (ii) dropping
water levels has provided impetus for the formation of an
irrigation district in the Grand Prairie and for efforts by the
State legislature to reformulate and codify Arkansas water law
(9). Computer simulation models are utilized to predetermine the
effects of three sample policy decision scenarios on Grand
Prairie Quaternary water users.

Furthermore, if the Colorado legislature really intended to
"integrate II groundwater and surface water "appropriations, use
and administration", then the creation of separate institutional
entities to govern groundwater, as provided for in the Act, is
not a logical move (5).
Tension, competition and conflict
accompany interagency efforts to coordinate management (16). For
this reason, achieving conjunctive use of ground and surface
water is more likely when both are managed by one agency (8,9).
Numerous

other

deficiencies

of

the Act

(which

will

not

discussed here) have been enumerated from the perspectives of
political scientist (5) and of an engineer (7).

be

a

As the preceeding indicates, formulating adequate water laws
Besides the uncertainties of nature, the
and rules is not easy.
legislator, judge, or administrator must also consider social and
political realities.
Unfortunately,
true interdisciplinary
analyses of potential effects of water laws are rarely made until
after legislation is passed or court decisions are rendered.
Those responsible for determining public water policy are often
unaware of available technological tools or are uncertain about
how such tools can be used.
Perhaps because of groundwater's
hidden nature, this lack of awareness is nowhere more apparent
than in efforts to provide a legal framework for groundwater
management.
The development of laws governing groundwater use
has
usually
preceeded an understanding of
an
aquifer's
characteristics.
As a result, perfected legal rights may bear
scant resemblance to an aquifer's actual ability to sustain the
legally permissible rate of pumping (12).
One
major difficulty in utilizing the
best
existing
technology to analyze proposed policy changes lies in defining an
interface between legal, economic and physical systems (15).
Operationalizing terms, for example, translating legal terms into
constraints suitable for inclusion in a computer groundwater
simulation model, requires either a working knowledge of both law
and
engineering
or cooperation and communication
between
practitioners of both disciplines (4). Even choosing units of
measure can be a source of misunderstanding. Gallons were
selected as the units of measure for water use in a draft version
of a proposed Arkansas water code.
One water resources engineer
spent considerable time explaining to a legislative subcommittee
why gallons would not be a feasible unit in application.
(Another engineer observed in 1909 that "measuring water to
irrigators in gallons would be like selling coal to railroads by
the ounce ll <6>.) Considering the general lack of familiarity
with basic engineering principles in our society, it is not
surprising that highly technical methodologies require some
elucidation.
The water resources engineer is obligated to make
his work accessible and understandable if he hopes to facilitate
the systematic design of water laws (7).
This paper describes efforts to accomplish this goal for the
Arkansas Grand Prairie, a major rice, soybean, and aquacultural
production area. A shallow Quaternary aqUifer supplies more than
half of the Grand Prairie's irrigation and other water needs.

,
I

TARGET LEVEL AND TARGET OBJECTIVE APPROACHES
Quantitative groundwater models have traditionally been used
to predict water levels that result from given pumping rates.
They
are
not designed to calculate the
annual
spatial
distribution of pumping which will maintain groundwater at
desired, or target, elevations.
A different modeling approach
has been developed to determine groundwater pumping that will
maintain preselected target levels (12,13).
The utility of the
target
level approach for maintaining 1982 Grand
Prairie
Quaternary water levels (as the chosen target levels) and the
legal
feasibility of using the approach with only
minor
modifications to Arkansas water law has been
demonstrated
(12,13).
A refinement of the target level approach allows the
investigator to choose a policy objective (10,11) rather than a
specified potentiometric surface, such as the 1982 water levels
previously reported. This target objective approach allows the
simultaneous determination of (i) the optimal steady state
potentiometric surface that best achieves the chosen objective
and (ii) the conjunctive use/sustained yield strategy that will
create and maintain that surface. Models with this capability are
valuable tools in the a priori analysis of water policy decisions
before implementation. This paper illustrates the ramifications
of three alternative policy decisions using the target objective
approach.

TESTED POLICIES AND RESULTS
The Court-Imposed Correlative Rights Scenario
As is true in most humid eastern states, water rights in
Arkansas are based on the old English Common Law (a,b,c,d,f,i,j)
and are delineated on a case by case basis (9). Under the common
law, the right to use surface water is contingent upon ownership
of riparian lands--lands directly adjacent to surface water--and
is an actual part and parcel of the soil (h,k). Similarly, the
right to use groundwater is incident to ownership of land
overlying a groundwater basin (f,g).
and

The "reasonable use" rule is the standard for both surface
groundwater use in Arkansas (d,f).
Riparian or overlying

1413

1414

WATER POLICY OPTIONS

COMPUTER APPLICATIONS / WATER RESOURCES

, ~I

legislature. The second, Senate Bill 33 and House Bill 126, is a
slightly more modified version of the 1983 proposal. There are a
number of differences between the two measures currently under
consideration , bu~ one common feature is the definition of legal
water use as !treasonable beneficial use".
Reasonable beneficial
use is defined as "the use of water in such quantity as is
necessary for economic and efficient utilization for a purpose
and in a manner which is both reasonable and consistent with the
public interest. lI

owners share a co-equal right to make reasonable use of the water
supply as long as such use does not unreasonably interfere with
the rights of similarly situated users (d).
No user "has
priority in use of water in derogation of another's rights" (k) •
An owner of land overlying groundwater in Arkansas has the
legal right to use the water "to the full extent of his needs if
the common supply is suffiCient, and to the extent of a
reasonable share thereof, if the supply is so scant that the use
by one will affect the supply of other overlying users" (f).
In
times of scarcity, the California correlative rights doctrine
governs, allowing each overlying landowner a proportionate or
prorated share of the available supply (e,f).
In a number of
California cases, the correlative rights doctrine has been
interpreted by the courts to require: (i) adjudication of a
groundwater baSin, (ii) determination of a safe yield, and (iii)
assignment of rights to a share of the available supply based on
extraction prior to adjudication (1,7).

Operationalizing this definition for inclusion in a water
resources
simulation
model requires agreement on
certain
assumptions.
First, as discussed above, the reasonable use rule
allows only those uses which are not "in derogation of another's
rights" (k). Neither groundwater (f) nor surface water (d) users
may unreasonably interfere with the rights of others.
As a
logical extension of this interpretation, uses which result in
saturated thicknesses so thin that wells become unusable, may
well be ruled "unreasonab1e ll •
For an agricultural economy
dependent on Quaternary groundwater, the economic results of
exhausting the aquifer's usefulness would be
catastrophic.
Finally,
mining which leads to excessive declines in the
groundwater level may permanently damage the aquifer through
compaction, lessening its future utility. Therefore, implementing
a pumping strategy which guarantees a sustained yield "is both
reasonable and consistent with the public interest."

Current pumping from the Quaternary aqUifer underlying the
Grand Prairie is such that the use by one does "affect the supply
of other overlying users".
The fact that a growing number of
wells are becoming unusable due to falling water levels and
inadequate saturated thicknesses is ample proof of this (14). In
the absence of effective water management, it is probably only a
matter of time before an injured water user initiates litigation
that will result in a court-ordered prorated redu~ti6n of pumping
to achieve a (safe) sustained yield. The question is, then, what
across-the-board percentage reduction of current extraction is
necessary in order to attain a sustained yield from the aquifer?
Utilizing the target objective approach, as described by
Peralta, et a1 (11). the consequences of a strict application of
the correlative rights doctrine can be predicted.
Under a court
ordered proportionate reduction, only 14% of 1982 pumping would
be allowed in each cell.
This 86% reduction in Quaternary
groundwater use would result in a short term net economic
reduction of over $8,000,000 per year for rice, irrigated
soybeans and aquaculture.
Being able to predict the result of
delaying groundwater management decisions (and by default turning
the courts into water management agencies) makes the need for
active management measures obvious.
It has been demonstrated
that, over the long term, Quaternary groundwater can supply less
than half of the demands currently being placed on the aquifer
(11).
This inability makes the need for conjunctive use of
ground and surface water evident.

Two Least-Cost Conjunctive Use/Sustained Yield Policy Scenarios
Two versions of a water code have been introduced in the
1985 Arkansas legislative session.
One measure, House Bill 85
and
Senate Bill 131,
is a slight modification
of
the
comprehensive water code proposed to (and rejected by) the 1983

Since Quaternary groundwater alone can meet less than half
of the long term demand, conjunctive use of ground and surface
water is a necessity (11).
"Economic and efficient utilization
for a purpose and in
manner which is both reasonable and
consistent with the public interest ll , then, may be translated as
a "least-cost conjunctive use/sustained yield strategy 11 for
testing policy alternatives.

a
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For these alternatives, the target objective approach (10)
is used to minimize the cost of attempting to satisfy the preexisting water needs for aquaculture,
rice, and irrigated
soybeans with ground water and supplemental diverted surface
water.
In performing the minimization, the model considers: (i)
the cost per unit volume of Quaternary groundwater (based on the
total dynamic head of a representative well in the center of each
three mile by three mile cell in the study area); (ii) the cost
per unit volume of diverted river water (in all cells to which
diversion is feasible);
and (iii) the opportunity cost-reduction, in net economic return--per unit volume of unsatisfied
water dema04 (in cells to which diversion of river water is not
feasible).
Th~ model assumes that divertable surface water
resources are ad~quate to completely satisfy demand not met by
Quaternary groundwate. in the cells to which surface water may be
diverted.
The model output is s- regional strategy consisting of
the specified annual volumes of Quaternary groundwater and
supplemental diverted surface water to be used in each cell.
In
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switch is implemented on a per acre-foot basis.
This suggests
that in a sustained yield setting, water may be the limiting
criteria and rules for strategy implementation may be at least as
approp~iately formulated on a per acre-foot basis.

the least-cost conjunctive use/sustained yield strategy, there
are some demands (water needs currently being supplied by m1n1ng
the Quaternary aquifer) that cannot be met over the long term by
Quaternary
groundwater
or diverted surface water) in the
northern part of the Grand Prairie.
Each of the following
scenarios
represents a policy designed to balance
actual
groundwater withdrawals in each cell with those specified in the
optimal least cost strategy.
The alternate crop switch scenario.
The alternate crop switch scenario outlines a mechanism for
reducing water demand in cells where water needs cannot be
conjunctively met over the long term. To reduce demand, acreages
are switched on a crop by crop basis from aquaculture, rice or
irrigated soybeans to nonirrigated soybeans. The question is how
to prioritize the crop switch.
Aquaculture provides the highest
net economic return per acre, but the lowest net economic return
per acre-foot of water.
Irrigated soybeans provide the lowest
net economic return on a per acre basis, but the highest net
economic return per acre-foot of water used.
If crops are
switched on the basis of the least loss in return per acre,
irrigated
soybean acreages are switched first to
dry land
soybeans,
followed by rice, and aquacultural acreages are
switched last. If, on the other hand, one wishes to minimize the
reduction in net economic return per acre-foot of unsatisfied
demand, then aquacultural acreages are switched to dry land
soybeans first, followed by rice, and finally by irrigated
soybeans. Table I shows a comparison of the two alternatives.
TABLE I.-Impact of chanl=!;inl=!;

acrea~es

Minimizing loss in
return per acre

Orange County (California) Water District has successfully
balanced the charge for overusing groundwater with the cost of
importing supplemental surface water (3,9).
The Orange County
Water District Act authorizes the district to (i) determine
whether an overdraft exists; and, if so, to (ii) "levy and assess
a charge or replenishment assessment".
The assessment varies
according to the price of supplemental water, to insure that no
water user has an economic incentive to overpump groundwater.
The set of incentives and disincentives for the Arkansas Grand
Prairie is necessarily different from the Orange County model.
In Orange County, all needs are met through groundwater and
purchased supplemental surface water.
Unfortunately, it is not
feasible to supply supplemental surface water to some cells in
the Grand Prairie,
so surcharges are calculated based on
op~ortunity costs as well as the cost of diverted river water.

Minimizing loss in
return per acre-foot

-2,980

Change from
current acres
Rice

-7,643

-6,806

Change from
current acres
Irri. Soybeans

-4,555

-3,265

-2,778,000

-=£. 70~.000

($5)

i)

to- d_ryJand soybeans.

Change from
current acres
Aquaculture

Change in net
economic return

L

-3,338

Most regional economic analyses are performed on a per acre
1asis. That approach implicity assumes that land is the limiting
criteria.
It is interesting to note in Table I that the
reduction in net economic return is slightly less when the crop

The economic incentive/disincentive scenario.
Under the economic incentive/disincentive scenario, rebates
and surcharges are utilized.
The following example merely
illustrates the utility of the target objective approach. and is
not
a
policy
recommendation.
Assuming
that
economic
considerations are the driving forces behind a water user's
decision to use groundwater or surface water or to voluntarily
switch to nonirrigated soybeans, the incentive (rebate) and the
disincentive
(surcharge)
must be sufficient
to
motivate
compliance with the conjunctive use/sustained yield strategy.
Water has traditionally been unvalued or undervalued (2,7).
Disincentives have, as a reflection of the societal devaluation
of water, often been too small to have any significant effect
upon water use patterns.

f
Ie

The cost of groundwater is a function of the total dynamic
head at the center of each cell and corresponding maintenance and
energy costs.
The cost of not using groundwater in a cell is
either the cost of delivering diverted river water to the field
or the opportunity cost of converting from a current crop to dryland soybeans. If the unit cost of an alternative to groundwater
is less than the cost of groundwater, then a rebate is offered,
as needed, to encourage adequate pumping to maintain regionally
desirable hydraulic gradients. In the sample simulation, rebates
are never required in cells not receiving supplemental surface
water. If.the unit cost of alternatives is greater than the unit
cost of groundwater, then a surcharge is levied for any pumping
that exceeds desired annual volumes. Costs are calculated on an
acre-foot basis and generally vary from cell to cell.
The
opportunity costs and surcharges are also different for each
crop. since the net economic return per unit volume of consumed
water varies from crop to c~op.

?;
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It should be noted that after implementation of a sustained
yield strategy, groundwater levels gradually evolve from current
levels to the target objective surface. During this process, the
cost of groundwater changes from year to year (as do rebates and
surcharges) until the target surface is reached (10).
The
discussion in this paper is limited to determining rebate and
surcharge rates for the first year of management, based on

actions.
Too often, judges, legislators and administrators are
unaware of availble techniical tools for water management or are
uncertain about how these tools can be used.
Water resource
engineers have the obligation not only to develop such tools, but
to also make them accessible and understandable.
J""

current data.

Rebates range up to $9.80 per acre-foot in cells where
diverted surface water is more costly than groundwater.
Since
there is no unsatisfied demand in these cells, rebates are the
same for each crop. The purpose of the rebates is to insure than
water users are not penalized for pumping more
expensive
groundwater to help maintain the regional optimal strategy, when
less expensive diverted surface water is available.
Surcharges exist for all cells that do not qualify for
rebates. Again, assuming current costs, surcharges in ceJls with
available diverted surface water range up to $17.89/acre-foot,
although for most cells it is less than $lO/acre-foot. For cells
without access to diverted surface water, the greatest surcharges
are $71.50/acre-foot for aquacultural use, $96.50/acre-foot for
rice irrigation, and $122.60/acre-foot for soybean irrigation.
Table 2 shows the maximum possible surcharges for 1985 water use.

I'

The applications represent possible policy choices made on
the judicial, legislative and water management district levels.
The potential for future use is not limited to research initiated
within
a single discipline, but to investigations in law,
political science and sociology as well as in
economics,
engineering.

APPENDIX I.

1.
Table 2.

Maximum Calculated Seasonal Surcharges

--------------------------------------Seasonal
Maximum
Maximum
Surcharge
($/ae-ft)

Water Use
Cae-ft/ae)

Seasonal
Surcharge
($/ae)

3.
4.

Aquaculture

71.50

7

500.50

Rice

96.50

2

193.00

2.

5.
Irrigated
Soybeans

122.60

0.4

49.00

-----------------------------------------------------------------

The surcharges are of such magnitude that the profit of
production would be eliminated, making it unlikely that producers
would overpump groundwater. If dramatic increases in crop values
occur after surcharge rates are fixed for the year, water"users
might wish to continue pumping at current rates. In such a case,
some $2,234,000 in total surcharge revenues would be generated.

6.
7.

8.
CONCLUSIONS

9.
Formulating appropriate water laws and rules is not easy.
Besides the vagaries of nature, water policy decision makers must
also consider the social and political ramifications of their

"

The paper 'pres~nts applications of the target objective
approach to regional" water management.
The approach is readily
adapted to interdisciplinary analysis and provides an interface
between legal, economic and engineering systems. It allows the
simultaneous determination of (i) the optimal steady state
potentiometric surface that best achieves the chosen regional
objective and (ii) the conjunctive use/sustained yield strategy
that will create and maintain that surface.
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